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ἐπειδήπερ. *Causatives* are those which are taken to express cause: they are these, ἵνα, ὥστε, ὅπως, ἐνεχα, οὕνεκα, ὅτι, διό, διότι, καθό, καθότι, καθόσον. *Dubitatives* are those which we are wont to use when we are in doubt: they are these, ἄρα, καὶτα, μῶν. *Inferentials* are those which lend themselves readily to conclusions and summings-up of demonstrations: they are these, ἄρα, ἀλλὰ, ἀλλὰ μὲν, τοίνυν, τοιγάρτοι, τοιγαροῦν. *Expletives* are those which are used for the sake of metre or ornament: they are these, δῆ, ῥά, νύ, ποῦ, τοί, θήν, ἄρ, δῆτα, πέρ, πώ, μήν, ἄν, αὖ, οὖν, χέν, γέ. Some persons add also *Adversatives*, as ἔμπερ, ὁμως.

KANT'S ETHICS.

By JAMES EDMUNDS.

[Continued from Vol. V., p. 307.]

V.—The Ethical End and Aim.

§ 85. "Superadd to the will of one sensitively affected (who would like to lie, because somewhat may be earned by it), the moral law. Then it is as when the experimenter adds an alkali to a solution of muriate of lime: the acid deserts the lime, combines with the alkali, and the earth is precipitated." Most extraordinary KANT!

However interesting such experiments are, we are not like to fall into the belief that morality is valid for man *because* it interests him. On the contrary, it interests solely because of its obvious and odious validity. The kaleidoscopic charm of exhibited virtue were surely insufficient to startle us out of placid resignation to the drift of nature, were not militant autocracy enforced by the native energy of the naked law. The obligation to descend into hell is expressed in the precept "**Know thyself**"; and the man who goes down voluntarily must know well that the precipitous way is the sole (however unwelcome) path of supreme duty. Not until he has thoroughly learned that in his own person unite the roles of ORPHEUS and EURIDICE, does he in search of himself valorously explore and with no backward glance immediately reconduct himself up the facilis descensus Averni.

§ 86. This VALOR (*fortitudo moralis*) is the true ethic strength (§ 53), manifest in the unflinching fulfilment of duty; and KANT acutely remarks that it were not VIRTUE (the strength of man) "unless it were brought forth by the firmness of man's resolution when combatting such mighty withstanding appetites."

As there is in *genere* but one reason, but one law of reason, and but one freedom (§§ 43, 62, 76), so there can be but one virtue, the strength of resistance to whatever determinator may propel toward injustice. But as the law (in application by means of the ethical schema) directs upon material ends and thereby constitutes particular duties, so it may be said that the one true virtue, thus (in the fulfilment of these duties) applied, becomes different practical virtues, corresponding to the several distinct offices of virtue (particular moral duties, such as not to lie). "To acknowledge several virtues, as we inevitably must, is merely to cogitate different moral objects towards which the will is guided and led by the one and single principle of virtue."

§ 87. He who endeavors to fulfil duty, approves his own conduct *pro tanto*; and this self-approbation is in itself no slight pleasure. KANT well says that no man can endure to hold himself unworthy of life; and the displacency following upon self-condemnation embitters any pleasure attained by unworthy means (violation of obligations). But he who persists in his worthy endeavor without ceasing, will probably surprise himself (and not infrequently) in the possession of an ethical complacency which is so far superior to self-approbation that it is untranslatable into language; and in this way virtue is truly its own reward, bringing along with it (in terra) a peace (*hominibus bonæ voluntatis*) which passeth understanding. But this most desirable peace is to be attained by no other means than constant struggle; and he who halts for a moment in his onward march toward virtue, fondly fancying himself already sufficiently virtuous, shall have no peace. To say that virtue is a quality (possessed of degree) is no doubt correct; but to maintain that the essence of virtue consists just in the degree of the quality (in other words, that the possession of a certain quantum of virtue is the essence of moral perfection), is to eradicate the very

notion of morality. To him who should attain moral perfection, the law would be no longer applicable; and so the aim of the law could be no longer commanded and the end of the law no longer indicated. To sum up all in a paradox: virtue is never found but in the seeking, and he who hath her hath her not.*

§ 88. The great extent of the moral law (which must cover every particular act of reason, else it were no law of reason), preventing the possibility of its complete fulfilment by any one agent (though if all agents were honestly to fulfil each his duty, the law must necessarily be fulfilled, no further obedience being possible), in connection with the complexity of the concerns of individual life, occasions indeterminateness of moral obligation. For while it is easy to state certain acts which we must do or omit (as not to steal, to obey just statutes, etc.), there are other duties (as beneficence) no less obligatory, which cannot be extensively determined. For instance, whether we give to the poor so great part of our means that our own family must suffer, or withhold from our hungry neighbor that we may enjoy superfluity, we are equally wrong; but the exact medium cannot be known, and each person must judge each case for himself as justly as possible. It is not lawful to neglect any duty because its extent cannot be accurately known; for the obligation would thereby be violated. The judgment in indeterminate cases must depend upon the maxim which governs the act; and if that maxim is in harmony with the law, the act is right.

* This is hard doctrine for those transcendent geniuses who if they may not issue upon some absolute end will begin no march; who find it "just as satisfactory to be resigned at the beginning as at the [what?] end" of an endless progress. But it involves no other presupposition than that the law precedes its subject. LEIBNITZ could not endure that form should precede the things themselves and determine their possibility: an objection, says KANT (remarks upon the equivocal nature of the conceptions of reflection), "perfectly correct, if we assume that we intuit things as they are, although with confused representation." But to think that form precedes things-in-themselves is irreconcilable merely with the thought of things uncreate and indeterminable, not repugnant to the understanding. For it is by no means the intuition which gives the permanence (not-beginning) of matter, but the understanding—the same understanding which confesses its own inability to deal in any way with this same permanent matter other than upon the presupposition of law. To annihilate the absolutely necessary presupposition, is to admit the apotheosis of the absolutely limited understanding with which FICHTE logically concludes.

§ 89. The interest of reason in the indeterminateness of moral obligation is inestimable. Although upon first view it would seem preferable that all acts should be morally determinate, yet manifestly if we are to know immediately that an act is right or wrong, we shall probably do or omit it and think no more about it, a procedure which does not so much tend to the exercise and consequent strengthening of virtue. But since we are obliged to use a continuous dialectic as to the morality of our actions, and are unable to conclude with certainty, and can approximately decide only by careful scrutiny of our own motives: it results that the faculty of moral judgment (conscience), developed by constant use, becomes more active and adept and easy of application: and the moral sense is rendered more acute, vastly increasing both the pain which deters from wrong and the pleasure which incites to right. And since virtue is inevitably its own reward, the most refined selfishness might forbid the neglect of any duty, however indeterminate.

§ 90. The facility with which the morality of actions may be evolved by consideration of their maxim is truly surprising. It is not easy to exemplify any rule, because instances are for the most part inadequate: but since we have nowhere attempted a categorical treatise, we have introduced examples without hesitation; and we here subjoin one which occurs: Yesterday we removed a large atlas from our desk. In passing through the office we were interrupted by an associate who inquired "Is the war over?" (the atlas no longer required?) He was answered that we wanted to use the atlas at our room. Conscience immediately condemned that answer: and the judgment was delivered as promptly and as apparently without consideration as the reply itself. But since reason never acts illogically, it is duty to recall by reflection the steps in the logical process which (were not originally omitted, but, being passed over with incalculable rapidity,) concluded in the first instance upon the reply and in the second upon the condemnation. Clearly it will not do to insist on the truth of the reply in the presence of the condemnation; so we must go to the motive again: this time we find that we do not desire to use the atlas at our room more than at the office, our real object being to secure more space

in the desk and to "satisfy the unities" by placing the book in our library. We next inquire into the motive of the lie: here it appears that there were present several gentlemen who might have inferred a wish to put the map out of their reach, a wish which if expressed would have been pronounced "mean." Hence the desire not to be accounted ungenerous prompted an inconsiderate and needless falsehood; and the maxim (to lie rather than seem ungenerous) needs no proof of its unfitness for law universal. No analysis of the lie itself can exhibit its falsity; but the recognition of the maxim instantly justifies the voice of conscience. The humiliation of such an examination is always salutary; for it strengthens the conviction that conscience, however warped, is apt to speak the truth to the attentive ear, and thereby assists to constitute a habit of attention which makes less difficult the performance of duty.

§ 91. But we cannot too emphatically insist that this sort of exploration does in no way increase the obligation of obedience to the law (§ 77). It is only because we cannot escape from the judgment of conscience, that we undertake the self-examination necessary to exhibit the deduction of the judgment. If the judgment were theoretic merely and esteemed invalid, no man would devote an instant to the development of its accordance with the systematic unity of all science (§ 49). Moreover, if the scientific deduction were essential to the validity of the deliverance of conscience, that validity could extend only to those agents who are competent to make the deduction; and he who is by force of hard circumstance prevented from high cultivation of his own rational faculty, might well plead ignorance of the law in avoidance of judgment. And when presently we come to consider the supreme occasion of the law (§§ 14, 96), we shall not be able sufficiently to admire that supreme adaptation of means to ends which admits no defeat and tolerates no avoidance, and which here as elsewhere distinguishes the architectonic character of the *natura naturans*.

§ 92. The intelligent knows himself merely as presenting a phenomenon to which he gives a law. Finding himself compelled to obey his law, he proceeds in accordance with his phenomenal method of ends to assign his intelligent self

as the end of his supersensible law. But of himself as an end he knows nothing more than the fact of existence. He yields obedience to the force of the pure law, and not to any figurative or abstract end. Himself as end is a pure abstraction, adding nothing to the law, which is an obstinate reality. For himself as end he may have no regard (§ 71): yet will he be unable to break the force of the law (§ 78). But as a doctrine, by the representation of himself as end the selfish man may be able to coact the pure representation of the law, setting over against the solicitations of the carnal man an ethical analogue (as it were) of the material ends of his phenomenal designs.

§ 93. This figurative sequent to the application (by an agent subject to sensuous solicitation) of the pure insensitive law, KANT represents as "an end which is at the same time a duty"; and the co-action which is effected by the adoption of this quasi end into human design, he seems to us to confound with the original spontaneous ACTION of the law (§ 80). "That there must be such an end," says he, "and a categorical imperative corresponding to it, is apparent from this: that were there are free actions there must also be ends whitherwards they tend as their object; and among these ends there must be some whereof it is of the very essence to be duties. For were none such given, then (because no action can be aimless) would every end be only valid in the eye of reason as a means instrumental and conducive toward some further end, and a categorical imperative would be impossible, a position which would overthrow all ethics," which would be very sad, certainly.

§ 94. Now the truth is that the purely insensitive law (§ 54) cannot possibly supply the matter of obligation (an end which is at the same time a duty), and can at furthest only give form to sensible design and direct to the adoption of such ends alone as (and of any ends of will that) are thereto conformable. KANT's ethical end is merely the necessary schema (§ 59) in and through which the otherwise inconceivable synthesis (of the heterogeneous elements, intelligible holiness and the deflected and sensuously subjected will of the man of flesh and hot blood) becomes possible (and constitutes virtue). To this end (as to any schema) no con-

ceivable matter can be adequate; and while it must be conceded that beneath softer skies it may perhaps (how, when, or where we know not) be possibly an objective end, it cannot by any means be admitted into the essential constitution of the obligation of the supreme law of reason, who tolerates no co-sovereign (§ 46) and resolutely refuses to rest upon any determination of sense, whether body or pure schema, her absolute ideal rule: *sic volo! sic jubeo! sit pro ratione voluntas!*

§ 95. It is true that no action can be aimless. But reason commands to act only because to act is essential to the world of nature, whereof the rational agent is constituent (§ 47): in other words, the merely human reason is a regulative, not a constitutive idea, and her law commands not so much to act, as (since man **MUST** act) **HOW** to act (§ 74). If there were no schema, she could not even regulate; and a categorical imperative commanding an end would be impossible, a position which would overthrow all applied ethics.

§ 96. But we understand that the categorical imperative (§ 5) depends upon no commandment of any end (§§ 57, 84) as its warrant and sure ground, but solely upon its position as the inexorable apodict of reason, by which supreme faculty it is moreover unremittingly thrust forward and enforced upon the world. We see also (Chap. IV.) how in and through the rational schema, man, the law is synthetically formulated and directed upon material ends, constituting and subsuming under itself particular offices of virtue: which offices are never adequate to the obligation of the law, and which ends can never enter into that obligation as the ethical end and aim of the law. Our deduction is therefore at an end and complete in so far as it subserves a practical behoof (§ 23); and it remains only to inquire, in order that the demand of reason for absolute completeness (theoretical as well as practical) may be satisfied:—What is the true end and aim of the law? What is the true content of the design which reason apprehends in the conception of her absolute law, which design cannot be abstracted from without destroying the very notion itself of law? And we shall be assisted in this highest speculation of supremest reason by the reflection (upon sure *a priori* ground) that such an end cannot only be no object in the world and hence no possible end and aim of human

design, but no object at all, and therefore no end and aim of any finite intelligence. Else were it not only inadequate to the law which directs upon it, but insufficient to check the daring progress of reason, which would unhesitatingly pass beyond it in search of that ABSOLUTE UNCONDITIONED upon which alone any determinate finds ultimate rest. What therefore we shall discover is no end and aim of our finite action, which it must be our duty as rational agents to adopt and approach; but such an end and aim as that MERELY TO BEHOLD IT is and ever shall be the complete and absolute occasion for the existence and exhibition of the law.

§ 97. The wondrous fact of morality in all ages and under all circumstances instructs man, who would fain set himself up as the author of a law from which he would fain escape, that so soon and so long as he attempts so to escape must he himself (man the inexorable judge) pronounce upon himself (man the willing culprit) never ending self-condemnation (§ 24), a judgment which neither contains nor threatens any penalty beyond the mere fact itself of its declaration, but under which to remain is itself the supreme penalty of supreme law. No doubt particular violations of material duties are followed by sensible pains and punishments; but these, however difficult to be borne, are utterly inadequate to the bare fact of the judgment, and would by the commonest reason gladly be a thousandfold endured, were it thereby possible to be rid of the terrors of the law itself. It is not to be denied that the material end and practical aim consequent upon the law is the conservation and continual advancement of phenomenal man. But the ethical end and aim of the law, (to which moreover three thousand recorded years of experience and observation have uniformly and irresistibly pointed), ever unconditionally demanded by reason in view of the unconditioned law itself, is the UNCONDITIONED AUTHOR HIMSELF, SEMPER DEUS.*

* It is 3266 years since in Asia the great Pharaoh, RAMESES MEI-AMOUN, in the fifth year of his reign, on the ninth day of the month Epiphi, marching against the insurgent tribes commanded by the prince of Kheta, found his troops driven back in terror before the city Atesh, on the left bank of the river Aranta, and himself for the first time in the face of defeat. To rally and inspire his broken cohorts, he himself in the presence of his army ordered his single chariot into the confederate ranks. "He was alone," relates a historian of his court, "no

§ 98. SCHWEGLER aptly characterizes the Neo-Platonic philosophy as a monism, and thus the most perfect develop-

other near him. And the king had with him neither his princes nor his generals, nor the captains of the archers or of the chariots. And this is what his majesty of the sound and strong life said:

“What then is the intent of my Father AMMON? Is it a Father who would deny his son? Or have I trusted to my own thoughts? Have I not walked according to Thy word? Has not Thy mouth guided my goings forth, and Thy counsels have they not directed me? Have I not dedicated to Thee magnificent festivals in great number, and have I not filled thy house with my booty? There is building to Thee a dwelling for myriads of years. The whole world is gathering together to dedicate its offerings to Thee. I have enriched thy domain; I have sacrificed to Thee thirty thousand oxen, with all the scent-bearing herbs and choicest perfumes. I have built for Thee upon the sand temples of blocks of stone; and bringing obelisks from Elephantina, I have reared eternal shafts in Thine honor. For Thee the great ships toss upon the deep; they bear to Thee the tribute of the nations. Who will say that like things have been done at any other time? Ignominy to him who resists Thy designs: felicity to him who understands Thee, O AMMON. I invoke Thee, O my Father! I am in the midst of a throng of unknown tribes and I am alone before Thee; no one is with me. My archers and my horsemen deserted me when I called aloud to them; not one among them hearkened to me when I cried to them for help. But I prefer AMMON to thousands of archers, to millions of horsemen, and to myriads of young men arrayed in phalanx. The wiles of men are as nought; AMMON will prevail over them. O SUN, have I not obeyed the order of Thy lips, and Thy counsels have they not guided me? Have I not given glory to Thee, to the ends of the earth?”

The incident is (said by the French savants to be) commemorated at Luxor, at Ipsamboul, at Beit-el-Wally, in the Rameseum, and at Karnak, upon one of whose walls it is related in extenso. Whether the ALEXANDER of his age actually delivered the invocation in the midst of battle, is not material for the purpose of this illustration; since even the uncritical predetermination to compress Egyptian chronology within the limits of the Mosaic genesis will not find it easy to assign to the record a date within the past three thousand years.*

At the Indian council at Fort Laramie, October 5, 1870. RED CLOUD, hero of eighty-seven battles, with uplifted hands, “in presence of the commissioners and the assembled Indians,” who all rose to their feet, “prayed:

“O GREAT SPIRIT, I pray You to look at us: we are Your children, and You placed us first in this land. We pray You to look down on us, so nothing but the truth will be spoken in this council. We don’t ask for anything but what is right and just. When You made Your red children, O GREAT SPIRIT, You made them to have mercy upon them. Now we are before You to-day, praying You to look down on us and take pity on Your poor red children. We pray You to have nothing but the truth spoken here. You are the Protector of the people born with bows and arrows as well as the people born with hats and garments;

* The poem of Pen-ta-ur upon the wall at Karnak is greatly disfigured by time; but it is partly preserved in the papyrus of Sallier in the British Museum, and partly restored by the labors of Champollion and other eminent Egyptologists. The reader may consult the Vicomte de Rouge’s memoir on “the campaigns of Sesostri,” *Revue Contemporaine* for August, 1856; or F. de Lamy’s “Rameses the Great.”

ment of ancient philosophy "in so far as this has striven to carry back the sum of all being to one ultimate ground." (§ 16.)

PLOTINUS, says SCHWEGLER, "has thoroughly striven to think of this first principle [unity] not as first principle, i.e. not in its relation to that of which it is the ground, but only IN-ITSELF, wholly without reference either to us or to anything else. This pure abstraction, however," adds SCHWEGLER, "he could not carry out."

Now this is just such a comment as one would expect from a disciple of HEGEL, to whom even absolute nothing is something to be carried out. It is difficult to avoid the belief that there must be some radically weak point in such great minds, that when they have accompanied reason to her ultimate deliverance (consciousness) and have discovered her ultimate ground (unity*) they must so persistently forget that the consciousness of the ground is no knowledge of the ground, and in itself gives nothing more than bare existence, and must so daringly venture the transcendent saltus which re-

and I hope we don't pray You in vain. We are poor and ignorant; our forefathers told us we would not be in misery if we would ask for Your assistance. O GREAT SPIRIT, look down on Your red children and take pity on them."

FAYEL, a correspondent who never lies, has particularly described to us the scene upon this occasion. We have carefully collated our copy with the original transcription made by JOHN RICHARDS, to whom and to LEON PALLARDAY (both of whom also heard the original delivery) RED CLOUD for this purpose expressly repeated the invocation. The result of our investigation is the conviction that the prayer is genuine and the transcription correct in general, though not quite literal. The personal character of the chief (one of the noblest of his people) does not concern the present illustration.

God always; but when His children are in trouble, they call Him "FATHER."

* This unity is immanent in knowledge and in nature (of which may be knowledge), but it is transcendent in idea; and of it (as transcendent) consciousness declares only that it exists.

In this connection it may be noted that the word "preposited" (§ 16) is not used inadvertently: we do not mean "presupposed," as has been "supposed." The presupposition stands in relation to the supposition, like its hypothesis, and with it would fall. But the unity which is preposited by consciousness is clearly abstract, completely independent, and (unlike consciousness) cannot be annihilated even in thought. And of all the apodictic deliverances of consciousness, this is the most apodictic.

We are not unaware that the words suppose and presuppose are by some used to indicate the proposition and the preposition; but they are so demoralized by the popular use that we would as soon undertake to expound "the idea of

moves them instantly beyond all stay and support (§ 21)—as though having climbed to the very apex of the highest tower in the earth, one may safely leap thence toward heaven.

Neither PLOTINUS nor HEGEL nor any finite intelligent can carry out such pure abstraction. It is enough that the philosopher is permitted to attain to it and to gaze upon its glory. If his soul does not expand in that gaze, expand into utter humility (not humiliation), let him remember that pearls are no fit diet for swine, and get him back to whatever his experience enables him most easily “to carry out.”

§ 99. But who, demands PLOTINUS, “could understand the full power [δύναμις] of ABSOLUTE UNITY?” (αὐτοῦ ὁμοῦ, the one in itself). For if otherwise, he adds, “how could one [τις, he, any determinate] differ from the one in itself?”*

Since therefore to know the INFINITE is not possible for the finite (§ 75), the grand old dialectician proceeds to illustrate that ecstatic instant in which as it were by a “flash of rapturous light” the soul becomes conscious of the absolute unknowableness of ABSOLUTE UNITY, as a separation from individual consciousness and an absorption into INFINITE INTELLIGENCE. This is that unparalleled magnificence of conception which the disciple of COMTE is unable to look upon without a sneer at “the vicious circle in which all such reasonings are condemned to move.”†

§ 100. PLOTINUS, SPINOZA, KANT—greatest among great names—the last not least—how large a portion of INFINITE LOVE must have blessed these three living, whose neglected

red” to a Texan bull as to restore their radical significance. Furthermore, they are convenient as degenerate.

* Τις ἂν αὖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἔλοι ὁμοῦ πάσαν; εἰ γὰρ ὁμοῦ πάσαν, τί ἂν τις αὐτοῦ διαφέρῃ. — Enneas V. lib. 5, cap. 10.

† LEWES sarcastically sums up the case thus:

“Axiom: The finite cannot comprehend the INFINITE.

“Problem: How can the finite comprehend the INFINITE?”

“Solution: The finite must BECOME the INFINITE.”

Of a truth, ye are the people, and with you wisdom will die!

Now comes one who asks “How does the INFINITE become finite?” and unblushingly explains that “the singleness of the determination sublates the otherness.” The spirit of the reply is no doubt very honorable, and far from the superficiality of self-styled positivism; but even a λόγολατρίστ might reflect that occultation adds nothing to the conception of substance, which last cannot

pages the spirit of INFINITE LOVE so gloriously illumines! The purpose of this brief review and recension of the philosophy of IMMANUEL KANT in reference to its central thought and motive will be fulfilled if it shall induce the reader to take no more Kantian doctrine upon trust, from whatever source, but to study for himself the works of the great thinker who met rationalism upon its own ground and in the interest of religion completely conquered it. SEMPLE exclaims that "the philosophic system of KANT is not a unity, which must be either wholly accepted or entirely rejected: it has a negative and a positive side, really opposed to each other." It is not true. The Kantian system *is* a connected whole and unity, and repays a thousandfold the patient months which bring at the last suddenly along the lines a blaze of light that irradiates and exhibits in new grandeur the whole universe. Happy IMMANUEL! how utterly hast thou entered into that very knowledge (falsely called "mysticism") which consists simply in PERCEIVING that knowledge is firmly rooted in the UNKNOWABLE, that reason declares her hidden source and spring with absolute certainty, that her earliest voice and her latest end and deliverance, speaking alike in the same unknown tongue, manifest to His creatures irrespective of intellectual condition the absolute existence of the ABSOLUTE ONE, the Siniatic I AM WHO AM.*

"I think," says KANT, "that the time will come when the Kantian system may laugh in turn, and with the greater justice, when it beholds the fair but airy castles of its opponents crumble to pieces at its touch, and their defenders taking fright amidst the ruins—a destiny which inevitably awaits them." No less does the same inexorable fate remain for the noble master's false disciples,† whose untruthful exegesis has for more than half a century degraded his title to a

be annihilated by an ideal and outrageously transcendent synthesis of the determinate and ABSOLUTE.

* Not "I am that I am," which is puerile, but "I am Very Existence." See the Vulgate.

† It must not be supposed that we question the sincerity of those who claim to be rationalists of the Kantian school. But however true to themselves, they are utterly false to their master.

term of reproach among men and made the rational method an unendurable stink in the nostrils of virtue. When that time comes (perhaps not in our day, but surely), he who shall be so favored as to stand upon the solid Kantian ground at the outer verge of just human inquiry, shall behold dangling betwixt heaven and earth the baseless feet of them who make haste to lay profane hands upon the very altars of the MOST HIGH GOD.

There is none like Thee among the gods, O Lord,
And no works like Thine.
All nations, which Thou hast made,
Shall come and bow down before Thee, O Lord,
And shall give glory to Thy Name.
For Thou art great, and doest wonders;
Thou art God alone.

THE PERSONAL RELATION OF CHRIST TO THE HUMAN RACE.

By GEORGE N. ABBOTT.

Within the scope of this comprehensive topic the present article will be devoted to the discussion of the following proposition, namely,

Christ's sonship to humanity is a normal and integral relation.

The truth of this proposition supposes on the side of humanity, that, considered in its normal state, it contains some latent principle or incipient germ constituting the rational ground or capacity on its part for a divine progeny. For if the relation in question be an integral one, then is not Christ's divinity in the least excluded from the human sonship; and if the sonship be a normal one, then must there be an original susceptibility for this relation in the proper nature of each party involved.

Again, if Christ's sonship to humanity be a strictly normal relation, then did he not go out of his proper species when he "became flesh"; while, on the other hand, if the relation in question were abnormal, his becoming flesh could be no otherwise regarded than as a transmigration into a lower